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PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY 
 
Karma Ura*  
Introduction 
 
As a bridgehead between two economic, demographic and 
geo-political giants – India and China - has had great 
influence on our perception of security, which changes in 
response to internal and external circumstances. Issues of 
security occupy a great deal of attention of the state even in 
peacetime. It has become somewhat customary to assess 
issues from the point of view security because of the 
heightened and staunch sense of security in the country. This 
habit has had a constructive impact. Bhutan has been 
politically a stable country having been kept out of colonial 
domination, cold war and regional rivalries1. 
 
Different explanations apply to different periods of 
maintenance of our security, depending on the nature of 
threat and warfare. In the 17th and early 18th century, the 
security threat was mainly posed from Tibet. In the 19th 
century, it was threat from Imperial British Raj with whom 
Bhutan was embroiled over the Assam and Bengal Duars2.   
 
The Bhutanese foreign policy, since the 1950s, has been 
clearly focused on forging a close relationship with India while 
broadening Bhutan’s links with the international community. 
The latter is inescapable consequence also of globalisation. 
There is no choice to be made between close ties with India 
and the growth of Bhutan’s international relationships: each 
track contributes to the national security and progress in its 
own way. This tenet of foreign policy has contributed to 
stability and progress in the country.   
   
                                                 
* Director, The Centre for Bhutan Studies. The author is thankful to 
Lyonpo Jigmi Thinley, Lyonpo Dawa and John Ardussi for their 
comments on the draft. 
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Contemporary security concerns are primarily two: the 
territorial incursions by United Liberation Front of Assam 
(ULFA) and National Democratic Front for Bodoland (NDFB) 
cadres in southern Bhutanese jungles and the problem of 
southern dissidents. The southern problem is a by-product of 
immigrant’s citizenship issue. The illicit intrusion of ULFA 
and NDFB cadres using Bhutanese jungles as sanctuaries is 
the result of internal conflict in Assam. Their intrusion points 
to the fact that the instabilities and unrest in the 
international border regions could spill over into Bhutan.  
 
Two Historical Advantages: Flexible Force (Pazap) and 
Inaccessible Terrain 
 
The newly formed Bhutanese state fended off persistent 
threats from Tibet for several decades in the 17th centuries. 
Both during and after the unification of Bhutan, frequent 
attacks were launched from Tibet. The unification of Bhutan 
by the Zhabdrung and consolidation of Gelugpa power in 
Tibet under the joint efforts of the Vth Dalai Lama and Gusri 
Khan, the Mongol leader from Kokonor region, were almost 
parallel processes which took place in the 17th century. The 
rule of Gelugpa sect (reformed sect), at whose head stood the 
Dalai Lama, over Tibet was forged mainly against the 
resistance of Princes of Tsang and Rinpung, just as the rule 
of the Zhabdrung over the whole of Bhutan was forged 
against the resistance of the lamas of western Bhutan and 
other provincial rulers.  
 
By mid-1730s, threats from Tibet eased off, after relationship 
was normalized between Tibetan ruler Pholha Sonam Tobgay 
and Sherab Wangchuk (1697-1767), the 13th Druk Desi (reign 
1774-63) 3. The period of reconciliation with Tibet was 
followed by the emergence of a new threat arising from the 
colonial expansion of the British Imperial rule spreading 
across northern India, adjacent to Bhutan. The state’s 
attention was directed, although in an interrupted manner, 
toward frequent disputes with the British Government about 
the Duars4. It was not until 1865 when a treaty signed 
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between the British Government and Bhutan brought a 
resolution to the conflict and stabilized the relationship. The 
treaty led to the slicing off of the Duars of Assam and Bengal 
by the British Government against an annual payment of 
compensation, known as subsidy, to Bhutan that is still 
honoured. The treaty, with certain amendments, was later 
renewed with the government of independent India.   
  
The military encounters with Tibet were more successful than 
with British India. It could have been due to similarity of the 
arsenal of fighting between the Tibetan and Bhutanese forces 
in the 17th century. Terrain and distance must have tipped 
the balance. The invading forces of Tibetans would have been 
at a disadvantage because of the depth of strike to reach 
places such as Paro, Punakha and Jakar. With the British in 
the 1864-65 war, Bhutanese militia faced ground troops 
armed in a superior way. Nevertheless, Bhutan remained one 
of the few uncolonized countries.  
 
However, the military engagements with both Tibetans and 
the British demonstrated the value of a certain mode of 
warfare that must have resembled methods followed by 
guerrillas, waged by the Bhutanese militia in rugged terrain. 
Though not written in accounts of any battles, the form of 
war oral sources describe suggest unconventional warfare. 
The natural defence position of the terrain combined with its 
intimate knowledge was a significant shield against 
successful invasion in the past. Rugged terrain by itself did 
not deter others; it seems that it offered an advantage to 
militias who were able to cut off enemy communications 
between the tail and the forward troops, especially when the 
expeditions stretched over seasons.   
 
Lack of written sources on military organization inhibits a 
clear inference about the extent of mobilization. But the 
pazap, a form of militia who could be called up for impromptu 
fighting, might have been as extensive as the swords, 
matchlock guns, steel helmets, shields, and other weapons 
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found in many households and goenkhang (house of protector 
deities) throughout Bhutan.  
 
Statistics on the number of tax paying households that 
existed in 1747 when combined with heuristic assumptions of 
non-tax paying households give rise to a total of nearly 
28,000 households5. If we assume that every second 
household kept a reserve pazap, eighteen thousand 
combatants would have been raised quickly at any point in 
time. This example gives a size of pazap-force much larger 
than standing army today. This is an implausible number 
unless one remembers that there is no cost attached to 
having a large pazap-force. Pazaps were a flexible-force who 
were disbanded and returned to civilian life in normal times. 
As far back as 1774, it was noted by a British mission, with 
regard to future military operations by the British against 
Bhutan, that "the Bhutanese have only six hundred men in 
pay as soldiers; but though their government is elective, they 
hold their lands by military service, and every man in their 
country is a soldier when called upon"6. There is no 
information that we know of such means of mobilization in 
neighbouring Himalayan countries. Though it is purely 
conjectural, the formation of a pazap-force might have been 
stimulated by repeated external threats and internal factional 
conflicts. At the same time, flexibility and cost-effectiveness of 
a pazap-force compared to maintenance of a standing army 
would have contributed to the security of the country by 
allowing a size of force disproportionate to the population to 
be raised, for short periods of time.  
 
Guardian of Institutions – Protector Deities 
 
The belief in the preservation of the state by special protector 
deities of the country is an important aspect of morale and 
psychological power. Gods are invoked in national defence 
and security even in unlikely places. Some years ago, an 
American leader while ordering the ground attack on Iraq, 
began so by saying "God Bless America".  
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Legends about protector deities mysteriously coming to 
protect its adherents abound in many countries. With a 
hierarchy of deities of varying statures, cascading down from 
the national to the natal areas, strong faith in the deities 
protecting their adherents exists in our country. This is 
apparent from the following excerpt from the letter of 27th 
December 1864 the Deb Raja of Bhutan sent to the 
commanding officer of the invading British forces: "...if you 
will take possession of my country, which is small, without 
fighting, and attach it to your country, which is large, I shall 
send the divine forces of twelve gods..."7. Moreover, the hands 
of a British military officer severed in the 1864-65 battle in 
Deothang and preserved in the sanctum sanctorum of 
Gangtey Gonpa is a reminder of how much of our 
psychological security has been vested in the hands of 
divinities.  
 
In almost every valley in the Kingdom, people invest faith 
gods and Bodhisattva who are considered transcendent 
beings. But there are also numerous lesser known 'worldly' 
gods (jigtenpai lha) and protector deities (sungma, zhidag, 
yulha, keylha etc.), whose existences illustrate the polytheistic 
structure of Bhutanese belief system. Deities having regional 
stature, as examples, are Phola Masang Chungdue in Haa 
and Paro; Tsan Palnam Dorji, Jowo (brother) Drakey in Paro; 
Talo Gyalpo Pehar in Punakha; Dayphu and Gopola tsan in 
Mongar; Geynyen Jagpa Melen and Domtshangpa in 
Thimphu; Sang Sangrey Deva, and Phola Taktshang Gangpa, 
Naspo chenpo Gomo konchog, Lha Gyal Tongshog in Dagana; 
Gomo and Dragchen Phola in Gasa; Sha Radrakpa and 
Kaytshugpa in Wangdi Phodrang; Keybu Lungtsan and Jowo 
Ludud Drakpa Gyeltshen in Bumthang; Ode Gungyal in 
periphery Kheng; Jowo Dhurshing and Mutsan Dorji Drachom 
in Trongsa; Terdag Zora Rakay in Kurtoe; Zhidag Mongleng,  
Dangleng, Garap Wangchuk, and Tshongtshong in 
Trashigang; Aum Kanchim in Pasakha; Ama Jomo and her 
sisters in far eastern Bhutan; Dungpa Changlo and the Raja 
Brothers and Zangpo Brothers  of Samdrup Jongkhar. There 
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are numerous other deities who are known only within the 
boundaries of small settlements. 
  
There seems to be two main styles of deities' invocations. The 
first method consists of elaborate rituals conducted by priests 
or monks, and the other mode involves recital and dance-
performances by pawo (man-shaman) and nejom (lady-
shaman). In the case of complex rituals by monks and lay 
priests, dough images, thrusel (water purification), saang 
(incense), serkem (golden beverage because a king of Tibet put 
a few gold nuggets at the bottom of the cup), thog buel (first 
food harvested in the year) are offered, while in the 
invocations by pawo and nejom, even marchoed (non-
vegetarian) offerings are made. There are predetermined 
calendars of deities' invocations throughout the country. The 
number of days and the amount of resources devoted to 
invocations of deities is quite significant. 
 
The safeguards granted by deities of a particular place extend 
not only to the adherents but their properties, most 
importantly temple establishments. Pal Yeshey Gonpo are the 
guardian deities of Kargyud doctrines while Talo Pehar 
Gyalpo, Gaynyen Jagpa Melen and Gomo are the protector 
deities of the Zhabdrung incarnates. Gonpo Jangdue became 
the protector deities of Ponlop Jigme Namgyel and his 
descendants. By extension, the country these rulers governed 
became the domain of such deities. The first Zhabdrung 
invoked the help of his protector deities in his fight against 
the Tsang Desi. The death of Gusri Khan (Sokpo Tenzin 
Chogyal)  in 1655 was supposedly caused by intervention of 
his protector deities. Gusri Khan, the Qoshot Mongol leader, 
who had helped the fifth Dalai Lama become the spiritual 
ruler of Tibet, had sent his troops to invade Bhutan in 1647. 
The de aths of several Tibetan personalities - Desi Tsangpa 
Phuntsho Namgyal and his wife in 1621 and Pagsam Wangpo 
in 1641 - who were ill disposed to the Zhabdrung, were 
attributed in Bhutanese sources to the Zhabdrung's magical 
power. Furthermore, it was claimed that Tibetan Regent 
Sonam Chophel died in 1658 due to the same cause. In equal 
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measure, Tibetan sources attributed the demise of several 
Bhutanese personalities to the magical powers of their deities. 
It is said that mutual hostilities were so bitter that the death 
of Desi Minjur Tenpa in 1680 was celebrated in Lhasa for 
three days. 
 
There is strong conviction in the safeguards assured by the 
deities among the Bhutanese. This is apparent in the 
proceedings of the National Assembly of Bhutan, which 
attribute the stability and peace in the country to two 
sources: the leadership of His Majesty the King and the 
sentinel of the protector deities, who look after the 
institutions the ancestral rulers established. Mystical reprisal 
in various ways, including sickness, fell on those who went 
against the interests of  the key institutions. The concept of 
biological warfare comes to mind. So long as such perceived 
threats are credible to the adversaries, internal or external, it 
is as good a deterrent as any other. Though we cannot fathom 
the true military value of such beliefs, one can safely say that 
it is a vital source of morale and psychological power that 
certainly magnifies the capability of the people.     
      
Frontiers Defence in the 19th Century 
 
Solving internal problems of succession and regularising 
administration probably went hand in hand with securing the 
northern frontiers. Tibetan and combined Tibetan and Mongol 
armies invaded Bhutan seven times (1618, 1634, 1639, 1644-
46, 1649, 1656-57, 1675-79) in the 17th century.8 Battles 
were fought involving both military campaigns and ritual-
magic on both sides.  
 
The last Tibetan invasion in the 17th century took place in 
1675-79; a treaty of peace was concluded in 1679. A Tibetan 
army invaded Bhutan again in 1730 and 1732 at the 
invitation of the chief of Paro valley, who declared Paro briefly 
independent during the civil war in Western Bhutan between 
1729 and 1735. Though a Tibetan army defeated Bhutan for 
the first time, the two countries soon embarked on a process 
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of reconciliation through a multi-pronged diplomatic initiative 
taken by the marvellous 13th Desi of Bhutan, Sherab 
Wangchuk (1744-63) together with an equally farsighted 
Tibetan ruler, Pholanas. The 19-year rule of Desi Sherab 
Wangchuk was perhaps one of the most successful periods in 
the whole of medieval history. The rift between Bhutan and 
Tibet was not only healed, but there were many jointly 
implemented projects both in Bhutan and Tibet, symbolizing 
a new spirit of cooperation.  The direction set by Desi Sherab 
Wangchuk to usher in peaceful and advantageous 
relationships with neighbours was lost, however, soon after 
he died in 1763. It is tempting to speculate how Desi Sherab 
Wangchuck's profound skills in leadership of enlightened self-
interest would have matched those of Warren Hastings, had 
he lived longer. For soon, in 1773, the first British mission to 
Bhutan was sent to Thimphu.  
 
The British began to express a motivated interest in Bhutan. 
The first British mission to Bhutan that took place in 1774 
however speculated "as for keeping possession of any part of 
it if conquered, or forming a settlement there, I consider it 
impractical unless done with the consent of the Bhutanese, 
which I believe will never be obtained"  9. But over the next 
century, British interest transmuted from trading to security 
concerns, especially over the 18 Duars, an area measuring 
over 3000 sq miles, under Bhutan. A series of incidents 
occurred on the southern front, even though peace was finally 
secured on the northern frontiers. Britain took issue with the 
delinquencies of lower officials in the Duars, arrears in in-
kind payment for the Duars and alleged raids conducted by 
Bhutanese. To understand the events in the south, we must 
briefly turn to an earlier period in the history of the Duars. 
 
Besides fending off Tibetan-Mongol armies in the north, the 
Bhutanese theocracy continued to advance its borders in all 
directions and met with some success both in the 17th and 
18th centuries. Conquest was directed not only toward the 
east but also toward south, in the direction of Assam and the 
Bengal Duars, which formed part of the Kingdom of Cooch 
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Behar. Campaigns were also conducted against the Lepchas 
of Sikkim, who lived to the west of Bhutan. Surely, the epithet 
Pelden Drukpa Chogley Namgyal, "victorious in all directions", 
rang true at that time. It is said that Ahom Raja ceded seven 
Assam Duars in Darrang and Kamrup to Bhutan against in-
kind annual payments. Darrang and Kamrup were under the 
jurisdiction of the Trongsa Ponlop. In addition, Bhutan 
already had claims on eleven Bengal Duars from Tista to 
Manas, the tract which included the districts of Ambari, 
Falakata and Jalpesh in Bengal, again given by the Cooch 
Behari Rajas in consideration of some in-kind annual 
payment. The Bengal Duars came under the jurisdiction of 
the Paro Ponlop. In the 18th and 19th centuries, it appears 
that Bhutan had an interesting administrative system. The 
Duars were administered by far off Ponlop; officials were 
appointed in Duars with titles like uzeers, kazis, kathams and 
subah.  
 
There was a brisk trade between the Duars and the interior of 
Bhutan. There is no reliable estimate of the revenue received 
from the Duars by the government through the two Ponlop. 
However, the British view that the Duars contributed several 
hundred thousands (lakhs) of Rupees of revenue to Bhutan 
and were fiscally and economically the most important part of 
Bhutan was probably correct. Hence the struggle to control 
the Duars might have been indeed based on crucial national 
economic interests. 
 
The alleged interference of the Bhutanese authorities in the 
affairs of Cooch Behar, which began in the 16th century, 
intensified in the 19th. Bhutan struggled to retain the Bengal 
Duars, which were now threatened by competing British 
power. In 1770, Desi Zhidarla's (alias Sonam Lhundup) forces 
advanced against Cooch Behar, a buffer between Bhutan and 
the British; it alarmed the British. Cooch Behar became a 
British protectorate after the first Anglo-Bhutan War in 1772-
73. The Assam Duars were annexed to British territory in 
1841, leaving a festering grievance against the British among 
a succession of Tongsa Ponlop, from Ugyen Phuntsho and 
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Tshoki Dorji to Jigme Namgyel (1824-1881), who were not 
reconciled to the territorial loss. After three campaigns 
conducted against Bhutan from November 1864 to November 
1865, British succeeded in extending their frontier to the 
foothills. Economic blockade was imposed by closing twelve 
passes. In the second campaign, Jigme Namgyel and his 
5000-strong troop, including logistic support, routed the 
British column in Dewangiri, and drove them back. The 
repulsion of British positions, from Chamorchee to Dewangiri, 
along the southern borders was carried out around the same  
time. British held several posts along the foothills since the 
first campaign. Tongsa Ponlop conducted the attack on 
Dewangiri post on the early hours of 30 January 1865. On 
25th January, Bhutanese forces attacked Bishensing, and the 
next day Buxa was attacked. On 27th January Chamorchee 
in Samchi and Balla Pass in Chhukha were threatened by the 
Bhutanese. Fighting along these positions became 
entrenched; British prestige, it was said, was tarnished at 
Dewangiri and Balla. Reinforcement of munitions and troops 
were assigned.  The third and the last expedition against 
Bhutan conducted with more than two brigades, and the 
economic blockade which lasting more than half a year; 
combined with a grave military threat to march to Punakha if 
negotiations were not held, led to the Treaty of Sinchula, 
1865. We might not be able to ascertain which vital goods, if 
any, the blockade stopped from their regular flow, but it 
certainly affected the caravan trade that many of the high 
officials plied privately. Bhutan was represented in the 
negotiations at Sinchula by Tongsa Ponlop Jigme Namgyel 
(Ponlop from 1843-1866) and Debi Zimpon Samdrup Dorji and 
Zhung Donyere Damchoe Rinchen. Bhutan lost more than 
betel nut harvests from the plains, but the war did convey a 
different impression of the Bhutanese to the British. The 
Bhutanese were described as brave but inexperienced hillmen 
ready to fight to the last. All the Duars were formally ceded to 
Britain in 1865, and a subsidy of Rs. 50,000 was paid 
annually in lieu of the annexation. The release of the annual 
subsidy became a significant leverage to nurture a friendly 
attitude toward the British. This was the last war Bhutan 
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fought. The Duar Wars of 1864-65 brought the Anglo-Bhutan 
relationship to a turning point. The Treaty of Sinchula 
established a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of Bhutan on the part of the British Raj. 
 
The Duar Wars were fought in the midst of increasing 
fragmentation of the Bhutanese polity. The fragmentation 
process really gained speed in the late 1850s and, it is 
doubtful whether there was a concerted effort to face the 
external challenge, in spite of the British comment that they 
acted in unison to resist foreign invasion. There were 
outbreaks of internecine conflict (nang khrug) generated by 
unregulated vying among the contenders for high positions. 
On the other hand, it seems that the conflicts, except in 
1860s and 1870s, have been exaggerated by later historians: 
only six Desi were assassinated in the whole of Buddhacratic-
republican period ruled by some 54 Desi over a period of 245 
years10. This is, by any standard, an index of stability. 
 
Relationship with the Pre- and Post-Independent India in 
the 20th Century 
 
For Bhutan, the 20th century commenced with a British 
proposal to open a route to Tibet up the Amochu and Dichu 
valleys, which reminds us of Bhutan's strategic role as one of 
the route control points. British government wanted to 
expand their relationship with Tibet, establish trade routes, 
negotiate a treaty that would secure British political influence 
in Tibet with respect to Tibet's third country relationship, and 
finalize the boundary between India and Tibet. One of 
initiatives in this direction was Young Husband expedition in 
which Ponlop Uygen Wangchuk played a key role. In 
accordance with prophetic divination revealed to the 13th 
Dalai Lama, Tongsa Ponlop Ugyen Wangchuk was accepted 
by Tibetans to mediate between Tibet and British Government 
of India. The offer of his mediation services appealed equally 
to Col. Young Husband. In the first month of the Wood 
Dragon Year (1905), trusted servants of Ponlop Ugyen 
Wangchuk were selected to accompany him. Among the fifty 
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people, the principle officials were Kazi Ugyen, Wangdi 
Donyer Kunzang Domchung, and Tsongpon Darjay of 
Trashigang. A Bhutanese source11 points to the crucial 
negotiation that Ponlop Ugyen Wangchuk played in saving 
Drepung monastery from the point of being destroyed by Col. 
Young Husband's troops. The role of Bhutan in the expedition 
of 1905 enhanced the prestige of both Tongsa Ponlop and the 
country. Therefore, the British, who considered him 
favourably disposed to British interests, also welcomed 
change in the position of Ponlop Ugyen Wangchuk into 
hereditary Kingship of Bhutan, which was offered by the 
Council and people of Bhutan in 1907.  At the same time, 
Ponlop Ugyen Wangchuk was tipped prophetically by 
contemporary lamas like first Khyentse, Jamyang Khyentse 
Wangpo, and Kongtrul Yonten Jamtsho to become the King of 
Bhutan.  The establishment of the institution of monarchy 
proved to be the most important factor in the stability and 
sovereignty of the country.  
 
Besides having a stable buffer, the British Raj’s main interest 
in Bhutan was to secure peace along the Indo-Bhutan 
frontiers (and expand trade through the Himalayas). Later, 
the doctrine evolved, with the Great Game, to control the 
influences of competing powers in northern and central Asia. 
Pre-Independant India was concerned about possible Tibetan 
and Chinese influence in Bhutan. A provision to minimise 
such direct influence formed a part of the bilateral treaty 
between Bhutan and pre-Independent India. In post-
Independent India’s relationship with Bhutan, too, this 
precautionary doctrine was inherited.  
 
Likewise, the British Government in India, in the first two 
decades of the 20th century, sought a peaceful Tibetan status 
as a buffer between three powers: China, Russia and Britain. 
But its view of Tibet vacillated and shifted several times from 
one of recognizing special relationship between China and 
Tibet in 1906, autonomy in all respects in 1921, and back to 
suzerainty.  British India initiated negotiations with the 
Tibetans and Chinese in an engagement to consolidate the 
Perceptions of Security 
 125 
1500 miles long frontier between Tibet and British India. This 
led to the Tripatrite Convention of 1914.12  
 
The eastern boundary between Bhutan and Tibet, and 
between British India and Bhutan were defined, or more 
precisely redefined, in the first half of this century. For 
example, the questions about the Balipara Frontier Tract and 
about the eastern boundary of Bhutan, whether it was up to 
Deosham or Dhansiri rivers, cropped up frequently in the 
1920s and 1930s.  Deb Zimpon Raja Sonam Tobgay Dorji, the 
father of the Queen Mother of Bhutan, represented the 
country in the dealings. A clear demarcation of boundary 
between post-Independent India and Bhutan, it seems, was 
formally completed only in the early 1960s. The inevitable 
impression that is created from reading history is that in 
almost all border settlements in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
the territory of what was once considered Bhutan has 
contracted.   
 
In 20th century, Bhutanese strategists, chiefly late His 
Majesty, realized the relative obsolescence of isolationism, as 
a defensive power, that was natural to a landlocked country. 
This is, however, not to say that impedance of indomitable 
terrain does not provide natural defences. It always does. But 
late His Majesty had to take several fundamentally new 
decisions in the late 1950s. In the light of new reality in the 
Himalayan region, the post-1960s Bhutan came to share a 
certain degree of strategic interest with India, in the nature of 
deterrence. This prospect of shared security arrangements 
generated a sense of assurance for its territorial security, as 
well as better prospects for rapid development.  Bhutanese 
strategic thinking13, therefore, led to a measured acceptance 
of overall Indian security arrangements as a means to 
protecting and strengthening its sovereignty.  
 
Prime Minister Nehru saw the Himalayas as natural barriers 
to enhancing the security of India14 and wanted to prevent the 
formation of a Sino-Bhutanese relationship in the image of 
Sino-Nepalese relationship that took place in the aftermath of 
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the visit of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to Kathmandu in 
1957. The notion of a special relationship between India and 
Nepal was replaced by the Nepalese principle of equi-distance 
between China and India. 
 
But what transpired from the meeting of Pandit Nehru and 
King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk in Paro was far more than 
friendly neighbourliness. There began a process of 
development with assistance from India directed first at 
building roads. The construction of roads began a year before 
the Indo-China war of 1962 and picked up steam afterwards. 
The conflict between these two giant neighbours also led to 
the modernization of the Royal Bhutan Army, with light 
infantry weapons and training provided by the Indian Military 
Training Team (IMTRAT) in 1963. This is often referred to as 
the moment when "Bhutan for the first time accepted India’s 
concept of broad security perimeter" 15. 
 
Described usually as a "special relationship"16, India and 
Bhutan have established a pragmatic and responsive 
relationship that was begun by the first Indian Prime Minister 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and King Jigmi Dorji Wangchuk, 
with the former’s July, 1958 visit to the Kingdom on 
horseback. In the same year, there was a dispute about the 
Sino-Bhutan boundary, after China occupied 300 sq km of 
Bhutanese enclaves17. Sino-Indian relationships, which were 
already strained at that time, were soon to become hostile. 
Although there was already an overwhelming Chinese 
presence in Tibet, it was a period when Nehru advocated 
Panch shila18, in Asia19 and Non-alignment, a movement 
repudiated by Chairman Mao as "illusions about a third road" 
which did not fit with his theory of two camps20. Prime 
Minister Nehru articulated those same principles of pan-
Asian idealism in his speech to the rural people of Paro, 
during his visit in 1958.  
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There is yet another geo-strategic dimension with respect to 
Indo-Bhutanese relationship. The creation of East Pakistan 
during the partition of India in 1947 and the independence of 
Bangladesh in 1971 left the mainland of India connected to 
its Northeast by a narrow 'choke-point', the Siliguri corridor, 
running between Bhutan and Bangladesh. The Northeast is 
hemmed in by Nepal, Burma, Bangladesh and Bhutan. The 
future scenario of development of the Northeast, as projected 
in the concept of a growth triangle, also depends on the 
participation of Bhutan21. In the same vein, Bhutan is 
landlocked and it is critically dependent on the seaport in 
Calcutta. Calcutta is closer to Bhutan than Guangzhou, a 
Chinese seaport nearest to Bhutan from the north. Thus, 
geography itself favours trade and transit ties with India.  
 
Over the last four decades, Indian aid has diversified into 
every sphere. Simultaneously, some of the programmes that 
were considered implicitly preserves of Indian assistance in 
the initial five year plans have gradually been opened for 
other donors. Mutual trust and confidence has allowed for a 
genial and frank relationship to emerge, along with the 
change of donor-recipient attitudes to cooperation for mutual 
benefit. On the whole, India has come to concentrate 
increasingly on investment in the hydropower sector, in 
accordance with a mutually beneficial economic strategy. The 
export of energy to India is seen as the key to achievement of 
Bhutan’s economic self-reliance. India’s economic assistance 
to Bhutan continues to be in quantitative terms the highest 
among all the donors. This is done on the premise that the 
security of Bhutan itself, and as an ally of India - a factor also 
in the security of India - is best served by a rich and 
prosperous Bhutan. Referring to Bhutan, Nepal and 
Bangladesh, the former Prime Minister I. K. Gujral, a highly 
respected figure in the region, said that "We have vested 
interest in their economic development, not in their non-
development" 22. Embracing post-cold war realism, he argued 
for non-reciprocal concessions to neighbours to promote 
greater economic and commercial cooperation. He was of the 
view that India should encourage improvement in the balance 
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of trade of these countries vis-à-vis itself. If the present 
overwhelming balance of trade in favour of India is allowed to 
continue, he said that "then in a way you are seeing that their 
economic development does not take place"23. In 1999, 
Bhutan's export to India, excluding electricity, was Nu. 2.7 
billion while its import from India was Nu 7.8 billion. 
Bhutan's export to India including electricity in the same year 
was Nu 4.7 billion. Thus, for Bhutan, revenue earning and 
balancing of trade is staked on hydro-power export to India. 
Hydropower has come to play an epic role in the Bhutanese 
economy. Certain Indian states will be critically dependent on 
Bhutan, with whom the Government of India has long term 
supply contracts, to meet their rising electrical energy 
demand. For both the buyer and the seller, this commodity is 
of strategic interest, which adds another layer of stake in the 
economic and strategic relationship between the two 
countries. The same economic security consideration applies 
to all the vital supplies, ranging from oil to rice, that come 
from India to Bhutan. In 1999, Bhutan imported 38 MT of 
rice, 17 MT of wheat, 33 million litres of diesel and 5 million 
litres of petrol; the volume of such strategic supplies are 
increasing rapidly to fuel high rate of growth of the Bhutanese 
economy.   
 
China and Bhutan 
 
The strategic interests of both China and India in South Asia, 
within which Bhutan is sensitively located, revolve around 
India and China's wish to mutually contain each other. China 
and India had ideological differences during the Cold War. 
India sponsored its non-aligned movement while Mao 
criticized the non-aligned movement. The attempt, by Nehru 
and other leaders, of the non-alignment movement to 
restructure international relations ended with closer Indo-US 
relations24 after Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the Indo-USSR 
relations formalized in 197125. China’s strategic view has 
been shaped by its fear of being encircled by its rivals – the 
US and USSR – and Indian allies and by its determination to 
reassert what it sees as its rightful dominant position in Asia. 
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Despite the century old Chinese-Russian rivalries, recent 
years have seen regular military exchanges between China 
and Russian since 1995. Beijing and Moscow have 
cooperation to foster multi-polarity and counter balance.  
    
Though there was a general improvement in Sino-Indian 
relations after the end of the cold war, question on the Sino-
Indian boundary remain to be resolved. A warming up of the 
relationship between China and India will produce a gradual 
change in the security perception in the region.  
  
The influx of Tibetans refugees and their potential to 
aggravate Sino-Bhutan relations led Bhutan to close its 
border with China in 1960. Cross border trade was brought to 
a standstill and has not yet been reopened formally. In the 
1962 war between China and India, both China and India 
were keen to maintain the neutrality of Bhutan26. "China 
issued a statement professing peace and friendship with 
Bhutan and the latter refused to allow the use of her 
territories by the Indian soldiers"27. A bilateral agreement to 
maintain peace and tranquillity along the Sino-Bhutanese 
boundary was signed, finally, in 1998. A similar Border Peace 
and Tranquillity Treaty was signed between China and India 
in 1993. 
 
There is no formal diplomatic relationship with China. 
However, official contacts with Beijing have been growing 
through both direct and multilateral channels. Dialogues, 
particularly on the boundary, are conducted according to the 
five principles of co-existence. Protracted negotiations on the 
demarcation of the Sino-Bhutan border, initiated first in 
1984, have reached the 14th round. The discussion is now 
close to final resolution. The Chinese approach on this matter 
with Bhutan is quite similar to the one it had taken earlier 
with Nepal, and as proposed once to India on the Sino-Indian 
boundary, with preference for a ‘package deal’ rather than a 
sector-by-sector settlement.   
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Illicit Sanctuary by ULFA and NDFB 
 
In the early 1960s, the nature of Bhutanese army forces 
changed from a reserve militia-style pazap-force, accustomed 
more to mountain warfare, to a conventional army with light 
infantry weapons.  Since its establishment along modern 
lines, the Royal Bhutanese Army has been concentrated 
mainly on the northern frontier with China. The Indo-Bhutan 
border was left open and porous. No military post was 
maintained along the southern border contiguous with India. 
Friendship precluded perceptions of threat from each other, 
and assistance provided by India was not allocated for 
defence against potential threats arising from any quarter 
within India. It adds to the irony that the security threat now 
facing Bhutan from ULFA and NDFB militant insurgents, 
against whom a large military does not necessarily enjoy 
superiority, came about from the unguarded southern 
frontier.  
 
The ULFA and NDFB militants have illicitly set up camps in 
the extensive mountain-forests of southern Bhutan. Their 
first entry was undetected in unbroken canopies of jungles.  
The rise of the southern immigration problem in the early 
1990s further deflected the attention of the Royal Government 
from the infiltration of militants. Throughout the 1990s 
discussion in the National Assembly was more or less 
monopolized by the threat posed by the southern immigration 
problem. The ULFA and NDFB militants exploited the 
national focus elsewhere to set up their camps in the jungles 
and conduct covert operations. Some observers believe that 
the train of militants entering Bhutanese forests could have 
started during ‘Operation Bajrang’ in 1990. Clear 
confirmation of the presence of make-shift camps came to the 
attention of the Royal Government as late as 1995, reportedly 
sighted by cattle-herders, whose annual migratory tracks take 
them through certain parts of terrain not frequented by 
anybody else, and whose knowledge of the landscape can 
barely be surpassed by professionals, military or otherwise. It 
was only as late as 1997 that the sanctuaries of ULFA and 
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NDFB militants in the country figured as a serious security 
threat in National Assembly discussions28. The implications of 
their illicit presence were disseminated to the citizenry by the 
media and by word of mouth. Immediately, people were 
strictly forbidden from offering any form of assistance to the 
militants in order to isolate them and deprive them of logistic 
support and supplies. Cutting off supplies to the militant 
camps; legal action against anyone helping the militants; 
peaceful dialogue to persuade the militants to leave the 
country; and military actions if all other measures failed were 
the four-step process outlined by the Royal Government29.    
         
The real question remains what to do with the militants 
taking shelter in the forests. Knowledge does not necessarily 
lead to action if the means to act do not exist. Lack of 
outposts in the south was the main cause of 
'unpreparedness'. A few bases for the Royal Bhutan Army 
have been recently opened in southern Bhutan. The 
suggestion to mount joint operations between Indian and 
Bhutanese troops, to make up for possible incapacity of doing 
it alone, do not have the same appeal to Bhutan as it does to 
India. Even with the deployment of new generations of 
weapons, effectiveness against guerrilla forces and small-
scale insurgents are uncertain and fighting them is often 
protracted. For Bhutan, the freedom for its search for a 
peaceful dialogue with the militants at its own pace inspired 
further confidence in close relationship between Bhutan and 
India. The National Assembly of Bhutan has resolved firmly 
that the security of Bhutan must be defended by the 
Bhutanese. The results of joint operations can be 
inconclusive, as demonstrated by past military operations 
involving many Indian divisions.  Partnership between the 
troops of the two nations could also provoke retaliation 
against Bhutanese civilians who transit everyday through 
Assam, where depredations by militants occur regularly. Thus 
the Royal Government has taken recourse to talks with the 
militant leaders, urging them to leave Bhutan. Exhortations 
for the militants to leave the country, in the two rounds of 
talks with ULFA and one round of talk with NDFB, have been 
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fruitless. The ULFA militants apparently insist on staying on 
until Assam attains independence, a chimera in the present 
circumstances. In the royal speeches that His Majesty the 
King delivered in late 2000 and early 2001 during the district 
tours, it seems that peaceful options are getting exhausted, 
and armed confrontation between the militants and the Royal 
Bhutan Army more likely.  The dilemma between increased 
security threat if their continued stay is tolerated, and 
reprisals against Bhutan civilians travelling through Assam, if 
an armed conflict is unavoidable, is indeed acute. Meanwhile 
an optimistic solution have been worked by the Royal 
Government of Bhutan. In the 79th session of the National 
Assembly of Bhutan held in the summer of 2001, the Royal 
Government of Bhutan reported that an agreement had been 
struck between the ULFA and Bhutan. According to this 
agreement, which was ratified by the National Assembly, 
ULFA will vacate and close four out of nine camps.  
      
Disturbance in the South 
 
The porous border in the South has been a factor in the rise 
of another major security threat. Undefended borders 
facilitate illicit migrations and a weak administration cannot 
detect them. But if the local population, who were prior 
immigrants, themselves favour the immigrants or unregulated 
entry of immigrants, even a strong administration can be 
impaired. These two factors essentially contributed to the 
arrival of Nepalese immigrants, drawn by favourable 
prospects of land and livelihoods. No doubt the British 
encouraged Nepalese immigration at the turn of the century 
as they did in Sikkim as a counterpoise to northern influence 
(of Bhutanese, Tibetan and Chinese) seeping down. At the 
beginning of 20th century, some Bhutanese authorities 
encouraged Nepali settlement in certain parts of southern 
Bhutan to work in commercial logging and clearing land. But 
the medieval subjects of the Druk Desi in the southern Duars 
were Assamese and Bengalese rather than Nepalese who 
arrived in mass relatively recently. The absence of significant 
Nepali settlement in southern Bhutan, until their initial 
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sightings in last stages of the 19th century, is reported by 
several British missions30. Bhutan could not have been 
spared the immigration when the immigrant Nepalese 
reached as far as India’s North Eastern states of Mizoram, 
Manipur, Meghalaya and Assam. Between 1978-80, many 
agitation-groups calling for ouster of immigrant outsiders 
were formed throughout the North East. Thousands of 
immigrant-Nepalese were evicted in the late 1980s from 
various North Eastern states of India, and became the 
proximate cause of Gorkha National Liberation Front 
agitation demanding statehood, starting in 198531.  The 
Gorkhaland movement was a stimulus to the southern 
problem that unfolded in the early 1990s. In fact, Gorkha 
National Organization and its affiliate Nepali Rasha Samity, 
and Darjeeling Pranta Parishad pledged their support to the 
rebels in late 1990. The triumph of Nepali Congress in 
Kathmandu, which ushered in a period of rapidly changing 
governments composed of various coalitions, had a 
bandwagon effect on the movement by dissidents. 
 
The competence of checking immigrants as well as the 
institutional capability to undertake demographic assessment 
and conduct a census grew quite late. The Citizenship Act of 
1958 was amended and passed in the 46th session of the 
National Assembly in 1985 but its enforcement through 
census was delayed because of the resource constraint. The 
census of late 1988-90 reported an uncomfortably large illicit 
immigrant-population in the five southern districts. A 
demographic transformation was on the way if the census 
had not been carried out. The district of Samtse alone 
reported an illicit immigrant population of 13,00032. The 
people whose citizenships were in doubt fomented dissent. 
The census stirred political agitation. Cumbersome 
enumeration procedures, where an entire family had to report 
to the census field office several times heightened their sense 
of insecurity and anxiety during which people can find 
difficult to be rational and prudent. The controversy over gho 
and kira, dress for men and women respectively, and 
omission of Nepali as the third language in primary schools in 
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southern Bhutan in 1989 became opportunistic issues for 
dissidents to rally other Lhotshampas33. Insurgency was 
launched to bring ‘mob’ and demographic pressures. The 
chronology of events spanning the critical years – 1988-93 - 
has been recorded34. Several fractious and activist 
organizations like the Bhutan’s People’s Party, People’s Forum 
for Human Rights, Bhutan Student’s Union, and United 
Liberation Peoples Fronts were formed in camps in Nepal by 
dissidents who left Bhutan. From external bases, especially 
the tea estates where they camped, hotheads took up armed 
attacks and menaced Bhutanese villages close to the border. 
There were raids, extortion, destruction and even kidnaps 
and killings. Propaganda to join the dissidents flowed from 
various organizations including the Publicity Cell of People’s 
Forum for Human Rights. There were scuffles at 
demonstrations in some southern towns in 199035.  
 
A solution process has finally emerged from agreement 
announced between Bhutan and Nepal in late 2000. It is 
contended that there are close to 100,000 refugees, including 
those born in the camps, from Bhutan. According to the 
agreed verification procedure, those in the camps who are 
evicted Bhutanese citizens in accordance with the Citizenship 
Act will be taken back. But it is suspected that the refugee 
camps have people who claim that they are Bhutanese 
citizens irrespective of the Citizenship Act. One of the 
demands that the dissidents wanted to impose forcibly, at the 
height of their movement in 1990, was an amendment to the 
Citizenship Act.36 There is a measure of contradiction in the 
dissidents’ wish to define citizenship by repudiating the 
Citizenship Act. In the popular media in Nepal, there has 
been uni-focal focus on human rights, sidestepping the 
citizenship issue. This has led the Bhutanese readers to have 
a perception of the Nepalese media as a prejudicial factor in 
the international debate on refugee issue.  
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That illicit immigration did not take place at all after 1958, 
the legal cut-off date for Bhutanese citizenship, is one end in 
the spectrum of argument, while recognition of all those who 
are in the camps in Nepal as bona fide Bhutanese citizens is 
at the other end of the spectrum. Both governments have 
agreed on the four categories within which refugees will be 
classified, as well as on the criteria of verification.  The 
verification process now agreed between Nepal and Bhutan 
will probe where the truth stands. The new millennium has 
begun with a major diplomatic advance between Bhutan and 
Nepal. Let us hope that a realistic solution emerges and 
realism prevails. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Bhutan has seen that unless a small country is vitally 
important in the global balance of power, crises in small 
states usually do not get international media profile. Small 
states are left to cope on their own, with risks, threats and 
disasters, which are considered distant crises of no 
international significance. The interests of small states can be 
subordinated to contiguous powers, large corporations, big 
economies, and even external paramilitary outfits. The fact 
that Bhutan has steered away from such influences, and 
toward a development path of its own, is a tribute to the 
acumen of its leaders, in particular His Majesty the King, 
Jigmi Singye Wangchuck. 
 
Security poses inordinate challenges for Bhutan, as its 
security establishments for deterrence capacity is minimal. 
This fact is considered to predispose its sovereignty and 
security to risk. The lack of pre-emptive capability for counter 
measures has been amply demonstrated against the 
destabilising spill over effects of militancy in Assam, and 
cross-border immigration into Bhutan spurred by poverty and  
natural disasters. Neither militancy nor poverty in the areas 
adjacent to Bhutan, which are the ultimate causes of the 
current security problems Bhutan faces, are unfortunately on 
decline. 
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On the other hand, Bhutan, like several small states, has 
been part of the globally important strategic countries that 
function as geo-strategic bases, as route control points, as 
buffer between large neighbours, and as rims in the defence 
of larger neighbours. It is a positional good that gives an 
inherent security strength to the country. Lacking technology 
and military strength, Bhutan has attempted to rely on non-
military security alternatives such as national identity for 
cultural cohesion, and neutrality to renew its long-term 
security. The relevance and role of cultural cohesion, 
neutrality and other non-conventional factors in the 
maintenance of Bhutan's security and sovereignty in a region, 
where sharpening of military weapons systems and 
massification of troops has continued, unabated is  subject to 
be investigated on its own.  
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